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I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Doctor-Patient
A doctor owes a duty to his patient and, in some cases, to the
patient's family to exercise his calling competently. In Hofmann v.
Blackmon,' a two-year-old girl sued her father's physician for negligently
failing to diagnose her father's condition as tuberculosis. She also sued for
injuries sustained when she contracted tuberculosis from her father
which, she contended, would not have occurred had the doctor warned
the members of the immediate family of the father's disease. The execu-
trix of the physician's estate maintained that the doctor owed no duty to
the minor child, and even if the doctor was obligated to apprise the family
of the patient's contagious disease, there was no dereliction of duty since
* The decisions surveyed in this article appear in volumes 227 through 249 of the South-
ern Reporter, Second Series.
•* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
•** Senior Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor,
Freshman Research & Writing.
1. 241 So.2d 752 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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the doctor had no knowledge of the existence of tuberculosis. The court
rejected this defense, and held that it is incumbent on the physician to
inform the immediate family living with the patient of the presence and
dangers of the patient's contagious disease so that the family members
may prevent their own contamination. This duty to inform exists notwith-
standing the negligence of the physician in failing to discover the con-
tagious disease.2
If a woman employs a surgeon to sterilize her and subsequent to
the operation she becomes pregnant and delivers a healthy baby, the
birth of the baby does not bar the plaintiff's suit. It is arguable that the
maintenance of such a suit would be contrary to public policy. The court
also noted that, if the cause of action depended on whether a healthy
baby was born, a dilatory defendant might, by delaying litigation for
nine months, thwart recovery entirely, thus forcing a plaintiff to bring
suit immediately or at least before delivery. Thus, while the birth of a
healthy baby might mitigate damages, it does not bar recovery in an
action for negligent sterilization.3
B. Manufacturers and Suppliers
Florida prides itself on being "a member of the advance patrol in
scanning"4 the development of implied warranties since the demise of the
privity requirement in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.5 Indicative of
this trend, a relatively recent Florida decision held that not only may an
action be brought against a manufacturer absent privity of contract, but
also that a disclaimer of warranty by a manufacturer who was not a
"seller" does not prevent recovery under an implied warranty.' The
Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in Florida in 1965, effective in
1967, provides, however, that a seller may disclaim an implied warranty
of merchantability by express language.7
In Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman,' a suit by the buyer of a Ford car
equipped with a defective electrical wiring system, the manufacturer's
written warranty contained an express disclaimer of any implied war-
ranty. Ford relied on the disclaimer of warranty of the Code to defeat
the buyer's recovery. The court, however, held that the manufacturer
was not a "seller" to the ultimate consumer under the Code, and there-
fore, could not rely on the Code's disclaimer provisions to escape lia-
2. The negligence of a physician is usually determined by expert testimony. However,
where the alleged negligent act is the application or administration of approved medical
treatment, expert testimony is not always necessary to the jury's determination. Furnari v.
Lurie, 242 So.2d 742 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
3. Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
4. Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So.2d 246, 248 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
5. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6. Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1967).
7. FLA. STAT. § 672.316 (1969).
8. 227 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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bility.9 In so doing, the court evaded resolution of the apparent disparity
between Florida case law and the UCC. The court emphasized that the
conflict should be resolved by the legislature and that it refused to be-
come "the operator of the guillotine"" ° in eliminating implied warranty
recovery from Florida law.
The doctrine of implied warranty imposes upon the manufacturer
and retailer the duty to assure that the item is reasonably fit for its ordi-
nary uses and purposes." However, if the defect is discoverable by
simple observation by those familiar with the special type of equipment,
no warranty will be implied. 2 Therefore, if plaintiff's employees had
examined the item and found no flaws, plaintiff may not recover under
implied warranty."
C. Business Invitees, Licensees, and the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
A retail establishment owes a duty to its invitees to exercise reason-
able care in the maintenance of its premises.' 4 Whether a particular plain-
tiff is an "invitee" is determined by one of three tests; namely, the "eco-
nomic or mutual benefit test," the "invitation test," or the "reasonable
care under the circumstances test."' 5
Under the first, the "economic" or "mutual benefit" test, the affirma-
tive duty to use reasonable care is imposed upon the proprietor only if he
receives some economic advantage in return. Therefore, it is the purpose
of the visit rather than the fact that an invitation was given which deter-
mines the existence of the duty. 6 Until recently, Florida had consistently
utilized the economic benefit test.'7 When this test was applied in cases
where there had been no material or commercial benefit to the business
occupier, the plaintiff failed to attain the status of invitee.' s
Under the second test, that of "invitation," the owner, by opening
his doors to the public and inviting their trade, impliedly warrants that
the premises are safe for the public's use. While the invitation test may
be based on an economic benefit to an owner, such a benefit is not essen-
9. Id. at 249.
10. Id.
11. Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 238 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970) (faulty fuel
system of front-end loader).
12. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
13. Fletcher v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 238 So.2d 142, 147 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
14. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 61 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
15. Lunney v. Post, 248 So.2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), noted in 25 U. MIAi L. REv.
771 (1971). The third test was mentioned in the Post case but has never been adopted in
Florida. It is called the "non-test" and involves nothing more than the "broad test of reason-
able care under the circumstances" to determine who is an invitee. Id. at 507.
16. PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 61.
17. See, e.g., McNulty v. Hurley, 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957).
18. See, e.g., Broad Street Christian Church v. Carrington, 234 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1970), in which the plaintiff was injured while attending her grandson's ordination at the
church. The activity was held to be "socio-religious," and because the church was not bene-
fited economically, plaintiff was not an invitee. Id. at 733.
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tial. Rather, the invitation theory permits individuals to achieve invitee
status even though they were, for example, merely browsing in the store
or using its rest room with no intention of making a purchase. The "in-
vitation" test answers the many complaints lodged against the economic
benefit test since allegation and proof of an intended purchase are not
required.
In Smith v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 9 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal rejected the economic benefit test in favor of the invitation
test. In Smith, the plaintiff entered the department store with the inten-
tion of looking at and perhaps buying some shrubbery. A fence display in
the store fell against plaintiff and knocked him down, causing the injuries
for which he subsequently sued. The defendant, Montgomery Ward,
asserted that plaintiff was not an invitee since he had not definitely in-
tended to make a purchase. The court, however, disagreed, and held that
through its advertising, a store seeks to attract customers to the premises,
even though it cannot expect everyone entering to buy. Thus, the people
responding have been "invited" by the store owner and are, therefore,
invitees, notwithstanding their lack of intent to purchase.
In another Fourth District decision, the court again applied the
invitation-invitee test.2" In the Lunney case, Mrs. Merriweather Post
gratuitously offered her home to be used in a garden club tour. Plaintiff
paid five dollars for a ticket from the club. While passing through the
home, plaintiff slipped on a sheet of vinyl material which Mrs. Post had
installed to protect her valuable oriental rugs. Clearly, plaintiff was not
a social guest. Also, Mrs. Post had not received any economic benefit
from plaintiff's visit. However, plaintiff had entered to tour the premises
after having bought a ticket for that purpose. The Lunney court, re-
stating its position in Smith, held the plaintiff to be an invitee of Mrs.
Post under the invitation test. The court added, however, that if forced
to reconcile its holding with Florida precedent, plaintiff could be found
to be an invitee under the economic benefit test.2 ' Both the minority and
majority suggested that the question be certified to the Florida Supreme
Court as one of great public interest.
A proprietor, though under a duty of reasonable care, is not liable
for injuries resulting from dangers of which he was not aware and which
he could not have discovered with reasonable care. Also excluded are
those dangers which the invitee could have reasonably anticipated or
discovered himself. If a business invitee is knocked down by an escaping
shoplifter, the owner of the store is not liable to the invitee since such
an event was not reasonably foreseeable.22 On the other hand, an owner
of a bar, whose agent knew of the dangerous propensities of one of the
19. 232 So.2d 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
20. Lunney v. Post, 248 So.2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), noted in 25 U. MiAMi L. REv.
771 (1971).
21. Id. at 507.
22. Graham v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 240 So.2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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bar's customers, is liable for injuries to a business invitee who was
attacked by the customer. 28
A homeowner, like a proprietor, is not an insurer of the safety of his
guests.24 Rather, the homeowner owes a duty to a guest-licensee to refrain
from wanton negligence or wilful misconduct which would injure the
guest. In addition, there may be a duty to warn of a defect or condition
known to the host, but not obvious to the licensee. In LeBase v. Britz,25
an eight-year-old was an evening visitor at defendant's home. While
playing in the backyard, the child ran into a needle point plant and was
permanently blinded in one eye. The trial court held, as a matter of law,
that there was no negligence on the part of the homeowner. The decision
was reversed on appeal. If the homeowner: 1) knows of a danger on his
premises; 2) which involves an unreasonable risk of harm; 3) which will
not be realized by the guest, the homeowner must "make the condition
reasonably safe, or ...warn the guest of the condition and the risk
involved therein." 26
In Sparks v. Casselberry Gardens, Inc.,27 a father brought an attrac-
tive nuisance suit for the death of his minor son. The fourteen-year-old
boy, accompanied by his friend, had entered the defendant landowner's
property and had begun to dig a tunnel. Evidence disclosed that the boys
had discussed the dangers inherent in such a project and had used boards
as a safeguard against a possible cave-in. The landowner was not held
liable. The court stated that to invoke the attractive nuisance doctrine to
permit recovery for a trespassing child's injuries, the condition on the
land must not only be attractive to the child and involve a serious risk of
harm to him, but must also present a danger which is unappreciated by
the child. Because the boys knew and appreciated the risk involved, there
could be no recovery.
D. Landlord-Tenant
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in the landmark case
of Smith v. Jung,28 held that a landlord who fails to have rescue equip-
ment and a lifeguard available may be liable to a member of a tenant's
family who drowns in the apartment house pool. The decision is an
extension of the lifeguard requirement for private and public pools
operated for profit. It was the first case in Florida, as well as in the
United States, reaching this result.
23. A Trysting Place, Inc. v. Kelly, 245 So.2d 875 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The holding
illustrates the rule that the owner must protect his invitees from acts of third persons which
he has cause to anticipate. See Johnson v. Hatoum, 239 So.2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) (run-
away auto).
24. PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 60.
25. 240 So.2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
26. LeBase v. Britz, 240 So.2d 819, 820 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), quoting from Goldberg
v. Straus, 45 So.2d 883, 885 (Fla. 1950). (Emphasis supplied by LeBase court omitted.)
27. 227 So.2d 686 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
28. 241 So.2d 874, 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), noted in 25 U. MIAIn L. REv 496 (1971).
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E. The Family
Florida, like many other states, continues to cling to the doctrine of
family immunity, denying a right of action in tort among members of a
family.29 In Orefice v. Albert,"0 a wrongful death and survivorship action
was brought by the mother for the death of her son who was killed as a
result of the negligence of his father who was co-owner and pilot of an
airplane which crashed. The named defendant was the non-family co-
owner of the airplane who, plaintiff conceded, was not actively negligent.
The court noted that the inter-family immunity rule precluded litigation
by the son's estate against the father. An action, however, could be main-
tained against the non-family co-owner. 1 The mother's wrongful death
claim against this co-owner was rejected, however, since the husband's
negligence was imputed to the wife.2
The Supreme Court of Florida recently held that a wife has a cause
of action for loss of consortium against a third person who negligently
injures her husband. Since the action is derivative, the wife may recover
only if the husband has a cause of action against the same third party. In
so holding, the court rejected the outmoded common law rule in favor of
the policy established by recent constitutional and statutory provisions as
well as judicial decisions which prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sex.
F. Master-Servant
The general rule is that a master is accountable for the torts of his
servant only when the tort is committed as part of the servant's duties
or within the course of the servant's employment. An exception to this
general rule is found in the Restatement of Torts. This exception im-
poses a duty upon the master to control the conduct of his servant, even
when a tort is committed without the course of employment, when it can
be shown that
(a) the employee is engaging in or shows a propensity to engage
in conduct that is in its nature dangerous to members of the
general public; (b) the employer has notice that the employee
is acting or in all probability will act in a manner dangerous to
other persons; (c) the employer has the ability to control the
employee such as to substantially reduce the probability of
harm to other persons; and (d) the other person must in fact
have been injured by an act of the employee which could rea-
29. Orefice v. Albert, 237 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1970).
30. Id.
31. The liability of the defendant was predicated upon his co-ownership of the airplane,
a dangerous instrumentality. Id. at 146.
32. Id. at 145. The boy was in his father's custody at the time of the accident with the
consent and knowledge of the mother. There was, therefore, a "sufficient community of in-
terest" to impute the father's negligence to the mother.
33. Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1971).
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sonably have been anticipated by the employer and which by
exercising due diligence and authority over the employee the
employer might reasonably have prevented. 4
In McArthur Jersey Farm Dairy, Inc. v. Burke, 5 a minor employee
was known to be a reckless driver. At the time of the accident, the em-
ployee had finished work and was driving his father's car when the car
struck the plaintiff on the property of the defendant employer. The minor
clearly was not acting within the course or scope of his employment.
Nevertheless, liability bottomed on the theory incorporated by the Re-
statement was imposed upon the employer since he had knowledge of
the employee's propensity for wild driving and made no attempt to safe-
guard against it.
G. Independent Contractors
Ordinarily, an owner of property is not responsible for the negligence
of an independent contractor. A traditional exception to this rule is where
the independent contractor is occupied in an inherently dangerous ac-
tivity. Although a gun is a dangerous instrumentality, a property owner
is not vicariously liable for the harm caused by the discharge of a gun
by a security guard employed by the owner to protect his property. It is
the activity and not the incidents thereof which determines the exception
to the rule. The guarding of property is a lawful activity which is not
inherently dangerous. 6 However, even where the owner engages the inde-
pendent contractor to perform work which is inherently dangerous, the
owner is not liable for injuries to the contractor's employee caused by the
dangerous instrumentality, absent negligence on the owner's part, if the
instrumentality was operated negligently by another employee of the
independent contractor.8 7
H. Carriers
A brick thrown through the glass panel of the folding door of a bus
richocheted and hit plaintiff, a fare-paying passenger. In her lawsuit,
plaintiff alleged that the municipally operated bus company negligently
failed to foresee the possibility of such an injury and prevent against it by
installing impenetrable glass windows. In addition, plaintiff proffered evi-
dence of prior rock-throwing incidents. In response, the defendant bus
company urged that since it complied with the minimum safety regula-
tions required by the Florida Statutes, it had satisfied its duty. The court,
relying on the well-tested principle that the common carrier must exhibit
the highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers, held that com-
34. McArthur Jersey Farm Dairy, Inc. v. Burke, 240 So.2d 198, 201 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970), comtruing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
35. 240 So.2d 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
36. Brien v. 18925 Collins Ave. Corp., 233 So.2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
37. Chrisly v. Florida Power Corp., 232 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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pliance with minimum safety regulations does not necessarily mean that
the carrier has met its high standard of care.8 8 The injury was foresee-
able, and because proper windows could have averted the injury, the bus
company was held liable. 9
I. Automobiles
1. THE DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE
A dangerous instrumentality is, by its nature, reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently constructed or operated. °
Florida applies the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to the owners of
automobiles.4 ' If the owner entrusts his car to another, the owner will be
ipso facto liable for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of the
automobile.42 The owner's liability is vicarious and arises from the prin-
ciple of imputed negligence.43
Whether the injured party may recover a judgment from the car's
operator after the owner of the car has paid a judgment into the registry
of the court raises the question of whether the owner and operator are
joint tortfeasors. In Geraldi v. Carlisle,44 the plaintiff, after having sued
and recovered a judgment from the owner of the automobile, brought
suit against the car's operator. Since the owner had paid his judgment
into the court registry as required under the statute,45 the defendant
operator argued that the judgment had been satisfied, thus prohibiting
recovery by the plaintiff against the operator. The operator's argument
was that under the doctrine of principal and agent, the owner could
recover from the operator any damages which the owner suffered as a
result of the accident.46 This recovery would be impermissible if the
owner and operator were joint tortfeasors since Florida forbids tort-
feasors seeking contribution from one another.4 7 The court rejected de-
fendant's contention. The rule established by the court is that for
purposes of a suit by the owner against the operator, the driver's negli-
gence is not imputed to the owner; however, in a suit by the third party,
the negligence of the driver will be imputed to the owner. Inasmuch as the
present action was brought by the injured third party, the owner and
38. Homan v. County of Dade, 248 So.2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
39. Id. at 237. The court rejected the city's argument that the action of the brick thrower
was a superseding cause because such an intervening cause was a foreseeable event.
40. See Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So.2d 299, 301 (Fla. 1956).
41. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 232 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Geraldi].
45. FLA. STAT. § 55.141 (1969). Under the statute, payment of the judgment by one
tortfeasor, when the plaintiff does not accept payment, does not constitute satisfaction of the
judgment as to preclude a subsequent suit by the plaintiff against the joint tortfeasor. Geraldi,
supra note 44, at 40.
46. 1 FLA. Jun. Agency § 58 (1955).
47. Kellenberger v. Widener, 159 So.2d 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
1971]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
operator are tortfeasors, jointly and severally liable to the injured
person.48
2. THE GUEST STATUTE
At common law, the owner of a motor vehicle owed an invited guest
the duty of reasonable care.49 In many states, including Florida,5 ° the
common law rule has been abrogated by the enactment of guest statutes.
Such statutes are designed to relieve an owner of liability in instances
where a guest-passenger is injured as a result of the ordinary negligence
of the owner.
Under the guest statute, the owner's liability to his guest is limited
to actions involving gross negligence, which, although an uncertain term,
is distinguishable from other types of negligence. Gross negligence is
more than simple negligence, and is often equated with willful and
wanton negligence. There is, however, a difference between the two.5'
Willful and wanton misconduct connotes a deliberate and intentional
wrong, while gross negligence suggests a course of conduct "likely to
result in grave injury when [sic] in the face of a clear and present danger
of which the alleged tort-feasor is aware." 2
The question of who is a "guest" within the contemplation of the
statute has often been posed. In Parson v. Reyes,5" the defendant, a
shareholder in a beauty parlor corporation, drove plaintiff, a beauty
operator employed in the salon, to a beauty convention. Plaintiff sued for
injuries received in a collision, alleging that she was not a guest under
the statute since the purpose of attending the convention was to improve
her skills, which in turn, would ultimately benefit the corporation. The
Florida Supreme Court agreed.
One important element in determining whether a person is a
guest within the meaning of the guest statute is the identity of
the person or persons advantaged by the transportation. If, in
its direct operation, it confers a benefit only on the person to
whom the ride is given, and no benefits, other than such as are
incidental to hospitality, companionship, or the like, upon the
person extending the invitation, the passenger is a guest within
the statute. However, if the transportation tends to the promo-
tion of mutual interests of both the passenger and the driver
and operates for their mutual benefit or if it is primarily for the
48. Geraldi, supra note 44, at 41.
49. PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 56;
So. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1969). The statute, being in derogation of the common law, has
been strictly construed. See Parson v. Reyes, 238 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1970).
51. Glaab v. Caudill, 236 So.2d 180 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
52. Id. at 185.
53. 238 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1970). See Engels and Freeman, Torts, 1967-1969 Survey of
Florida Law, 24 U. MIAsi L. REv. 617, 627 (1970) for a discussion of the district court
opinion.
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attainment of some objective or purpose of the operator, the
passenger is not a guest within the meaning of the statute.5
Consequently, because some benefit accrued to both the plaintiff pas-
senger and defendant operator, the passenger was not a guest; therefore,
she was not required to prove gross negligence to recover.
Before a passenger can be labelled a guest, the passenger must have
accepted an invitation.55 Thus, an infant, legally incapable of exercising
the judgment factor involved in assenting to a ride, does not come within
the terms of the guest statute. 6 Similarly, an owner needs no invitation;
thus if an owner is a passenger in a vehicle driven by another, the statute
does not apply.5 7
J. Defenses
1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The question of contributory negligence in cases involving children
often presents complex issues. Whether a child has the capacity to know
and appreciate the dangers of his own conduct depends on the age of the
child and on his individual level of maturity. Accordingly, uniform stan-
dards of conduct, such as those applied to achieve objective equality in
cases involving adults, are inappropriate.
The most significant recent case in the field of contributory negli-
gence of children is Swindell v. Hellkamp.5  In Swindell a four-year-
seven-month-old girl, unmindful of her mother's warnings, darted out into
the street and was hit by defendant's car. At trial, an instruction was
given that the question of contributory negligence was a factual deter-
mination to be made by the jury. Plaintiff objected to this instruction and
moved for a directed verdict on the question of contributory negligence,
asserting that a child of that age could not, as a matter of law, be guilty
of contributory negligence. The motion was denied. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, but certified the question to the
supreme court as one of great public interest. The supreme court held
that a child under six years of age is conclusively presumed to be in-
capable of contributory negligence. This rule was predicated upon the
common law rule that a child under seven years of age is incapable of
perpetrating a crime. The age modification-six years instead of seven-
was based on the court's opinion that "a child must learn individual
safety at an early age but social consciousness comes at a somewhat later
age." 59
54. 238 So.2d 561, 563-64 (Fla. 1970).
55. Cook v. Theriot, 249 So.2d 457, 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) (four-year-old child) [here-
inafter cited as Cook], citing Andrews v. Kirk, 106 So.2d 110 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
56. Cook, supra note 55, at 458.
57. Bukspan v. Flaks, 228 So.2d 432 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
58. 242 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Swindell].
59. Id. at 709. Accord, Moores v. Vandoren, 248 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), wherein
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2. ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
In Brevard County v. Jacks,6" the administrator of the estate of a
mentally retarded eighteen-year-old girl brought suit against the county
for damages resulting from the girl's drowning death in a man-made lake
owned and operated by the county as a recreational facility. The deceased
had a history of epileptic seizures. A buoy line, though usually present to
separate the deep from the shallow end, was not in place on the day of the
accident. The county contended that the girl died as a result of an epi-
leptic seizure, and that by entering the lake with knowledge of her dis-
ability, she had assumed the risk. The court stated that to establish
assumption of the risk, in addition to voluntary exposure to the risk, the
defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff appreciated the danger
involved. Having failed to establish that the mentally retarded girl under-
stood the nature of her act, the county's defense was held to be without
merit.
3. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
Following an accident at a marked intersection, plaintiff sued the
other driver, his insurer, and also Dade County. In his complaint, plain-
tiff alleged that the accident would not have occurred were it not for the
county's negligent construction and design of the stop sign at that inter-
section. The circuit court dismissed the complaint and plaintiff appealed.
The Third District Court of Appeal held that Dade County was a
"metropolitan county," a political subdivision of the state, and therefore,
the sovereign immunity doctrine precluded suit against it. The court also
refused to adopt plaintiff's exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine
which permits suits against a city for "negligent nuisances."'"
K. Wrongful Death and Survival Actions
The child's right to sue for the wrongful death of a parent is deter-
mined at the time of the parent's death. In a case of first impression in
Florida,' the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a child, who at
the time of his natural parents' death was legally adopted, could not
maintain a suit under the Florida Wrongful Death Statute 4 for the death
a jury charge on the defense of contributory negligence of a four-year-nine-month-old pe-
destrian struck by defendant was reversible error on the basis of Swindell, supra note 58.
See also Campbell v. Washington, 240 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), where the court ap-
plied the Alabama rule that a child between seven and fourteen-years-old may be con-
tributorily negligent upon a showing that he possesses the discretion, intelligence, and
sensitivity to danger possessed by an ordinary child of fourteen years of age.
60. 238 So.2d 156 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
61. Schmauss v. Snoll, 245 So.2d 112 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Of course, even where the
city may be sued, legal and proximate cause must still be shown. See Elliot v. City of Lake
City, 230 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) (wrongful death).
62. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla. 195, 182 So. 911 (1938).
63. Powell v. Gessner, 231 So.2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Powell].
64. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01 and 768.02 (1969).
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of his natural parents through the negligence of another. The adoption
decree had the effect of completely severing "every legal and moral tie
which theretofore existed between the child and its natural parent or
parents,"6 5 and therefore, the child had no legal right to sue.
The mother of an illegitimate child, however, may recover for the
death of her child under the Wrongful Death Statute.6 The rationale
underlying the rule is believed sound. The mother of the illegitimate child
ordinarily cares for the child and suffers a loss with the child's death. The
same usually does not hold true of the father of the illegitimate child.
Therefore, while the mother of an illegitimate child may recover under
the statute, the father may not.67
II. STRICT LIABILITY: ANIMALS
A. Dogs
Section 767.04 of the Florida Statutes (1969) imposes absolute
liability upon the owner of a dog which bites a person who is in a public
place or who is lawfully on the property of the dog's owner. However, the
owner is not responsible if he: 1) prominently displays a "Bad Dog"
sign; or 2) the person bitten "mischievously or carelessly provoke[s] or
aggravate[s] the dog inflicting such damage. ' 68
In Carroll v. Moxley, 69 the supreme court dealt with the first of
these two exculpatory provisions. Plaintiff entered her mother's hardware
store and was bitten by her mother's german shepherd. Beside the
counter in the store was a gate with a sign reading, "Beware of Dog"
and "Keep Out". Suit was brought relying on both Florida Statute section
767.04 (1969) and the common law as a basis for recovery. The trial
judge, in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruled that
the statute abrogated the common law, and that since a "Bad Dog" sign
had been posted, there was no basis for liability. The supreme court
reversed, emphasizing that the posting of such a sign does not alone
satisfy the statute. The sign must be prominently displayed and easily
readable so as to put a person on notice of the risk. Whether a particular
sign meets this requisite is a factual question which must be determined
from the circumstances in each case. It is evident, though, that a sign not
65. Powell, supra note 63, at 51, relying on Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
66. City of West Palm Beach v. Cowart, 241 So.2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
67. Id. at 752. In arriving at this decision, the court relied on the case of Hadley v. City
of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 435, 65 So. 545 (1914), which noted that the 1906 Wrongful Death
Statute legally recognized the mother of a bastard child but not the father.
For a wife's standing to sue for the wrongful death of her allegedly common law hus-
band, see Williams v. Dade County, 237 So.2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
68. FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1969).
69. 241 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1970). The case came to the supreme court on a writ of certiorari.
Petitioner claimed the statute violated the constitutional provisions allowing for redress of
injury. Although the court held that the statute was constitutional, it actually enlarged dog
bite protection since it eliminated the common law requirement of scienter by the owner.
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prominently displayed and not easily readable will not relieve a dog
owner from liability.
70
B. Trespassing Cattle
The common law of England required the owner of cattle "to keep
them contained at peril or suffer damages for trespass...."7 In an effort
to encourage and protect its growing stock-raising industry, Florida pro-
vided by statute in 1823 that an owner was not liable for the trespass of
his stock onto the property of another. 2 This "open range" provision was
repealed in 1949,71 leaving open the question of what rule Florida would
apply in a case involving trespassing cattle.
In just such a case, Rockow v. Hendry,74 the defendant cattleowner
argued that the common law rule had never been in force in Florida prior
to enactment of the open range statute, and therefore, there was no exi-
gency to apply it now. The court, in response, delineated the history of
common law animal trespass in Florida and found that common law lia-
bility did exist prior to the enactment of the open range law. Therefore,
with the repeal of the open range statute, the common law rule was rein-
stated rendering the defendant strictly liable for the trespass of his
cattle.75
III. INTENTIONAL TORTS
A. Assault and Battery
Provocation, such as verbal abuse, does not justify an assault.76
While provocation by the plaintiff does not mitigate compensatory dam-
ages it may, however, mitigate punitive damages. In an action against a
servant and his master for the servant's assault, it is not reversible error
for the court to award compensatory damages against each defendant,
but punitive damages against only the employer. The sanction of punitive
damages is used to punish the tortfeasor, but it is not meant to render
the tortfeasor bankrupt. If the servant will be bankrupted by the amount
of money damages imposed upon him, the jury in its discretion, may
assess punitive damages upon only the more financially secure master.7
70. Id. at 683.
71. Rockow v. Hendry, 230 So.2d 717 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
72. FLA. STAT. §§ 588.02-06 (1941), formerly REv. STAT. § 875 (1892).
73. FLA. LAWS 1949, ch. 25357, § 9, repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 588.02-.06 (1941).
74. 230 So.2d 717 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
75. Id. The decision was limited to areas of law where the Warren Act, FLA. STAT. §§
588.12-.25 (1969), and special legislation do not apply.
76. Austin v. U-Tote-M of Broward, 241 So.2d 186 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
77. Brown v. Palmer, 245 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1971), quashing 233 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1970).
78. Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So.2d 291, 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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B. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Justifiable reliance is one of the essential elements in an action for
fraud.79 In Tippett v. Frank,"° the trial court entered summary judgment
against the defendant second mortgagee in a foreclosure suit. The de-
fendant appealed, urging that the defense of fraudulent representations
had presented questions of fact precluding the granting of a summary
judgment. The district court affirmed, holding that the defense of fraud
raised in the answer was legally insufficient in that there was no allegation
that the defendant relied upon the representation.
Until recently, the quantum of proof for fraud was determined by
whether the action was brought at law or in equity.8 At law, the common
law tort of deceit required only a preponderance of the evidence, i.e.,
the greater weight of the evidence. In equity, however, a stricter standard
was imposed, and fraud had to be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Since the merger of law and equity, the Florida rule has been that
a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence is necessary to estab-
lish fraud, regardless of whether the action is at law or in equity.8 2
Traditionally, one of two tests has been utilized to determine the
measure of damages in an action for fraud and deceit. The test used by
the majority of jurisdictions, the "benefit of the bargain" rule, awards the
plaintiff what he would have obtained had the defendant's representations
79. The essential elements for a cause of action for fraud are:
(1) a false statement of fact; (2) known by the defendant to be false at the time it
was made; (3) made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act in reliance
thereon; (4) action by plaintiff in reliance on the correctness of the representation;
and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff.
Poliakoff v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 249 So.2d 477, 478 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971) (sale of in-
surance policy falsely represented to be non-cancellable). As regards a claim for false state-
ment of fact of a future occurrence, a plaintiff must allege that the representation was "made
without any intention of performing it, or made with the positive intention not to perform
it . . . ." Bernard Marko & Assoc., Inc. v. Steele, 230 So.2d 42, 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (sale
by corporation of its equipment; fraudulent representation as to encumbrances on items),
quoting Home Seeker's Realty Co. v. Menear, 102 Fla. 7, 135 So. 402 (1931).
Reliance is not justifiable where the information is equally available to both parties.
Abbate v. Nolan, 228 So.2d 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) (obtaining monies by fraud). ("His
knowledge was practically as great as that of the appellant." Id. at 436). See also Lisbon
Holding & Inv. Co. v. Village Apts., Inc., 237 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (quality and
condition of real estate) ("[The] seller had reasonable opportunity for inspection prior to
purchase." Id. at 199). For the same principle, see Finney v. Frost, 228 So.2d 617 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1969) (fraud by yacht broker in selling boat). ("Either party could have learned of
the status of the bills by a phone call." Id. at 618.)
A causal connection between the fraud and resulting damage must be alleged by the
plaintiff in his complaint. See, e.g., MacDonald v. American Oil Co., 248 So.2d 231 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1971), in which the plaintiff, an automobile accident victim, sued the seller of recapped
tires who represented them as "used" for injuries caused by the blowout.
80. 238 So.2d 671 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
81. Matthews v. Matthews, 133 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). See also FLA. CoNsT.,
art. V, § 6.
82. Rigot v. Bucci, 245 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1971), overruling Thomas v. Pennsylvania
Thresbermen & Farmer's Mut. Ins. Co., 167 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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been true. The minority follows the "out of pocket" rule, which gives the
plaintiff only what he has actually lost. Florida permits the use of either
rule in a fraud action "in order to do such justice as the circumstances
may demand."83
C. Libel
Libel is a tort against reputation. Thus, communication or publica-
tion of the libel is indispensible to liability. If the defendant merely mails
the allegedly libelous letter to the plaintiff's agent-attorney, it is tanta-
mount to the defendant mailing the letter to the plaintiff. Therefore, the
requisite communication to a third party has not occurred, and no action
will lie.84
In New York Times v. Sullivan,85 the United States Supreme Court,
in order to insure freedom of expression in matters of public interest,
created a constitutional privilege which protected misstatements of fact
or opinion concerning the official conduct of public officials. The privilege
can be overcome only by a showing of actual malice, i.e., that the state-
ments were knowingly false or made in reckless disregard of their truth or
falsity.
Florida invoked the New York Times rule in the case of Bishop v.
Wometco Enterprises, Inc.86 An investigator, employed by the city, made
factually erroneous statements at a public hearing concerning alleged
inequitable assessments by the local tax assessor's office. The investigator
named Wometco Enterprises as having received preferential treatment.
In a series of editorials broadcast over its television station, Wometco
countered with the allegation that the investigator had intentionally or
negligently made the untruthful statement. The investigator sued
Wometco for libel. The court held that since the investigator was em-
ployed by the city, he was a "public official" under the rule of New York
Times v. Sullivan, and therefore, the investigator had to demonstrate
actual malice by Wometco in order to recover for libel. While the edi-
torials might have embraced inconsistencies, inconsistencies alone were
insufficient under the New York Times rule.
The actual malice test also extends to defamation of persons classi-
fied as "public figures. ''87 In Gibson v. Maloney,8 the president of the
local telephone company in Port St. Joe, Florida, addressed the Apa-
lachicola Rotary Club on the topic of the physical development of the
area. The president observed that telephone service expansion had oc-
curred everywhere except in Apalachicola, and he attributed this fact to
83. DuPuis v. 79th St. Hotel, Inc., 231 So.2d 532, 536 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), involving
false representations by a husband and wife to induce the sale of their hotel.
84. Maine v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 So.2d 857 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter cited as New York Times].
86. 235 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
87. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
88. 231 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970).
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statements made by a local Apalachicola newspaper which had sought to
arouse public indignation against persons who controlled the telephone
company. Maloney, the publisher and editor of the Apalachicola Times,
sued Gibson and the St. Joseph Telephone and Telegraph Company for
slander and libel and was awarded $15,000 by the trial court. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed."9 On certiorari, the
supreme court reversed. By virtue of his articles, Maloney had made
himself a public figure and "a part of the passing scene," 90 so that a state-
ment made about him was "fair comment"'" on a public matter. The pub-
lisher, therefore, was required to establish actual malice. Since he was
unable to do so, the libel suit failed.
D. Mental Distress
In Sacco v. Eagle Finance Corp.,92 the Third District Court of
Appeal held, inter alia, that an allegation of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, in and of itself, was insufficient to state a cause of action.
Citing Slocum v. Food Fair Stores93 and Kirksey v. Jernigan,94 the Third
District held that in order to state a cause of action for emotional or
mental distress, some other intentional tort must be coupled with the
mental distress claim. In addition, not all mental disturbance is com-
pensable. For instance, no recovery is allowed for wounded feelings. In
Sacco, a suit against a collection agency for its attempt to collect a debt
of the plaintiff's daughter was dismissed because the complaint failed to
aver another intentional or malicious tort and proffered nothing more than
a case of gross insult.
E. Interference with the Contractual Relations of Others
The intentional and unjustified interference with a contractual rela-
tionship constitutes a tort in Florida. 5 If the defendant induces one of
the parties to a contract to breach that contract, to the injury of the other
contracting party the injured party may sue the defendant wrongdoer.
While malice is a necessary element of the tort, malice will be implied
when the court finds that the defendant intentionally caused economic
harm to the plaintiff. The elements of this tort are:
89. Maloney v. Gibson, 214 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
90. Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So.2d 823, 824 (Fla. 1970).
91. Id. at 824. See also Hauser v. Urchisien, 231 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1970); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 254 So.2d 386 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
92. 234 So.2d 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) (also involving trespass and invasion of privacy)
[hereinafter cited as Sacco]. See also Miller v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 235 So.2d 33 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1970) (insurance agent taking policy without permission), wherein the evidence
presented a question of fact for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress.
93. 100 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
94. 45 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
95. Franklin v. Brown, 159 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
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(1) the existence of a business relationship under which the
plaintiff has legal rights,
(2) an intentional and unjustified interference with that rela-
tionship by the defendant,
(3) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the
business relationship.6
IV. NUISANCES
Occasionally, to protect the interests of the community and its land-
owners, a court or legislature will designate something to be an "absolute"
nuisance or a nuisance "per se." In essence, one who creates or maintains
a nuisance per se on his land will be liable for that nuisance, even though
no negligence was involved in its creation. However, "[n]othing which
is legal in its inception is a nuisance per se. To be [such] . . . it must
appear that it is a nuisance at all times under all circumstances, regard-
less of location and surrounding.""8 A sewage treatment plant is not a
nuisance per se; however, it may become a nuisance if other facts and
circumstances make it one.99
The Florida Statutes provide that one who maintains, owns, or leases
a building which tends to annoy the community or injure its health "shall
be deemed guilty of maintaining a nuisance."10 When such a nuisance
exists, an enabling statute' allows any citizen of the county where the
nuisance is located to sue in the name of the state to enjoin the continu-
ance of the nuisance.
In a suit brought pursuant to Florida Statute section 823.05 (1969),
tenants alleged that their apartment building constituted a public nui-
sance. The defendant-landlord argued that the tenants' complaint was
insufficient because it failed to allege that the community at large, as
opposed to the individual tenants, was adversely affected by the condi-
tion. The court noted, however, that the plaintiffs were suing in the name
of the state, and in addition, had alleged the existence of serious health
dangers which would constitute a danger to the entire community. Even
though the plaintiffs were individual tenants, they were, nevertheless,
members of the public and could therefore bring suit under the statute
to enjoin the landlord and to abate the public nuisance on the apartment
house premises. 0 2
96. Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So.2d 278, 280 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), holding
there was no interference by subsequent tenants of shopping center with contract between
agent and shopping center developer.
97. PROSSER, supra note 14, at § 90.
98. Larson v. Village of Lava Hot Springs, 88 Idaho 64, 72, 396 P.2d 471, 475 (1964),
quoted in AIA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard Co., 246 So.2d 126, 129 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1971).
99. AIA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard Co., 246 So.2d 126 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
100. FLA. STAT. § 823.05 (1969).
101. FLA. STAT. § 60.05 (1969).
102. State ex rel. Brown v. Sussman, 235 So.2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), wherein a
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In a pollution case, the City of Coral Gables argued that the City
of Miami's incinerator constituted both a public and a private nuisance.'13
As a defense, the City of Miami argued that there were several sources
of pollution in the county worse than its own. The court refused to ac-
cept such an argument. If the court had accepted the argument no pollu-
tion suit would ever have a chance of success. 104 The court added that
while violation of a local pollution control ordinance was not, in and of
itself, sufficient to establish a nuisance, evidence of such a violation was
admissible in determining whether a nuisance did, in fact, exist. 0 5
V. DAMAGES
The question of adequacy of damages for the prospective estate of
a deceased child was considered by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Laskey v. Smith. °6 In the plaintiff-administrator's action for the death
of her two-year-old daughter, the jury returned a verdict of $31,200.
The trial judge allowed plaintiff to choose the alternative of accepting
a remittitur of $21,200 or accepting a new trial."0 7 Plaintiff appealed,
and the district court of appeal reversed the order of the trial judge.0 8
Petition for certiorari was granted by the supreme court on the basis
of an alleged conflict between the district court decision and prior Florida
cases.10 9
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial judge may review
a verdict, but "[h]is setting aside a verdict must be supported by the
record . . . or by findings reasonably amenable to judicial review.' 110
While no proof of the child's prospective estate had been offered at trial,
the court reasoned that the prospective estate of a child is, at best, a
question of speculation and conjecture. Therefore, because of the lack
public nuisance was created by improper sewage disposal, the presence of vermin and
rodents, and improper trash removal. The court also noted that punishment for violation of
a law does not constitute a bar against an action for enjoining a public nuisance. Id. at 48.
103. City of Miami v. City of Coral Gables, 233 So.2d 7 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id. at 11.
106. 239 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1970).
107. The acceptance of a remittitur by the trial court is an alternative to the granting
of a new trial on the issue of damages. Love Realty Corp. v. O'Brien, 162 So.2d 532 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1964). Thus, an order granting a new trial on the issue of damages only if the plain-
tiff files a remittitur may be an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Stopko v. Farrington,
235 So.2d 28 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). Of course, if the verdict is grossly excessive and based
only on speculation, there is no abuse of discretion in refusing to order acceptance of the
remittitur as an alternative to the granting of a new trial. Materials of Miami, Inc. v.
Matthews, 227 So.2d 524 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
108. Smith v. Laskey, 222 So.2d 773 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
109. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1970). The cases allegedly in conflict were:
Gresham v. Courson, 177 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) and Burch v. Gilbert, 148 So.2d 289
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). The court held that while Burch presented a conflict with Laskey,
Gresham did not.
110. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1970).
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of evidence concerning the value of the child's prospective estate, the
trial court's finding that the jury's verdict was excessive could not be
sustained. While the verdict might have raised "a judicial eyebrow [it]
should [not] shock the judicial conscience."Mn1
111. Id. Several other appellate cases refused to overturn the jury's verdict: McNair v.
Continental Ins. Co., 245 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) ($2,500 for wrongful death of 22-
month-old child, including mother's subsequent pain and suffering) ; Durett v. Davidson,
239 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970) ($10,000 to 78-year-old plaintiff in auto accident not ex-
cessive).; Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Gibson, 227 So.2d 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) ($78,000 for
plaintiff husband in negligence suit).
